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ARGUMENT
I.
Deputy Geisel Had Reasonable Suspicion To Investigate Why Pylican Entered A Storage
Facility Two Hours After It Closed
As set forth in the state’s opening brief, the district court erred when it concluded
that Deputy Geisel did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Pylican and investigate her
entry into a storage facility two hours after it closed. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-8.) The
mere possibility that her presence there was legitimate did not negate reasonable suspicion
that she was trespassing or engaged in theft or other criminal activity. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 5-8.) In response, Pylican argues that only an officer who had “made contact with the
owners or managers to determine if people are eligible to be in the facility after hours”
would have reasonable suspicion to investigate a person for being on the premises of a
business after the business is closed. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 10-11.) Pylican’s argument
that information from an owner or manager is a constitutional prerequisite to the detention
of a person seen entering a closed business is without legal or logical support. The district
court erred in concluding that Deputy Geisel lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Pylican
to investigate why she had entered the storage facility when it was closed.
An investigative detention is justified if an officer has “reasonable suspicion to
believe that criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273
(2002) (emphasis added, internal quotation omitted). “An investigatory stop does not deal
with hard certainties, but with probabilities.” State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 126, 233
P.3d 52, 57 (2010). “The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause,
but more than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer.” State v. Spies, 157
Idaho 269, 272, 335 P.3d 609, 612 (Ct. App. 2014). “The quantity and quality of
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information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that necessary to
establish probable cause.” State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 684-85, 263 P.3d 145,
149-50 (Ct. App. 2011). “[R]easonable suspicion can arise from information that is less
reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330
(1990).
Here the officer knew through his own observations that Pylican entered a storage
facility near midnight, about two hours after its closing. (3/22/18 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 1-13.) He
suspected Pylican was not authorized to be in the facility at that time because (1) a sign at
the facility said its “hours of operation are 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.”; (2) he has driven by
the facility when it was closed “on multiple occasions and not observed any other vehicles
in there after 10:00”; and (3) “he has come in contact with people who were trying to access
the storage facility after 10:00 p.m. who told him that they have codes because they are
renters of units in that facility and that their codes would not cause the gate to operate after
10:00 p.m.” (3/22/18 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 1-25.) This was more than ample evidence to create
suspicion that Pylican was not authorized to be in the facility, and that her unauthorized
access may be criminal in nature.
Pylican attacks only the third factor above: that renters had informed Deputy Geisel
that their codes would not allow them access to the facility after hours. (Respondent’s
brief, pp. 8-12.) Specifically, Pylican adopts the district court’s analysis that those
statements were unreliable because “‘[t]hose people, of course, could certainly have been
lying.’” (Respondent’s brief, pp. 9-10 (citing 3/22/18 Tr., p. 11, L. 24 – p 14, L. 9).) To
get reliable information on when the codes would work, according to Pylican, Deputy

2

Geisel would have to have “made contact with the owners or managers” of the facility.
(Respondent’s brief, p. 11.) This argument fails for at least two reasons.
First, as noted above, the information that can support reasonable suspicion can be
less reliable than the information required to support probable cause. Deputy Geisel
testified that he had seen people trying to access the facility after hours, he had contacted
them, and they stated that they were customers of the facility but could not get in through
the gate. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 28, L. 23 – p. 29, L. 12.) That these customers could not access
the facility after hours was consistent with the other information Deputy Geisel had,
namely that the “hours of operation” clearly posted at the facility were from 8:00 to 10:00
and that Deputy Geisel had never seen vehicles in the facility after 10:00 before. The only
reason provided for concluding that Deputy Geisel’s reliance on these statements was not
reasonable was that the people he talked to “‘could’” have been lying. (Appellant’s brief,
p,. 9 (quoting 3/22/18 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 11-19).) Of course any person providing information
to a police officer “could” be lying. Here there was absolutely no reason to believe they
were, and their information is entirely consistent with the other facts known to Deputy
Geisel. Deputy Geisel reasonably relied on these statements, and the assertion that the
facilities owners and managers were the only reliable sources of information on when the
codes would grant access is contrary to both law and reason. -----See White, 496 U.S. at 330
(“reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to
show probable cause”).
Second, even if the statements were not reliable, the other information Deputy
Geisel had made his suspicion reasonable. Deputy Geisel saw the hours of operation posted
at the facility. Those hours of operation were from 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. In the many
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times he had driven past the facility at night while on patrol he had never before seen
vehicles inside after 10:00. It was reasonable to conclude that the facility was not in
operation at midnight.
If any interpretation of the evidence is unreasonable, it is the district court’s. If
renters could operate the facility at any time, there is no reason to post the hours of
operation at all. And even if the district court’s interpretation were reasonable, such would
not render Deputy Geisel’s belief that access was restricted after 10:00 unreasonable.
Concluding, based on the posted hours and his own observations of when the facilities were
used, that renters could not legitimately access the facility outside its hours of operation
was more than “mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer.” Spies, 157 Idaho
at 272, 335 P.3d at 612. Because it was reasonable to suspect that Pylican’s entry into the
storage facility after the hours of operation was not authorized, Deputy Geisel had
reasonable suspicion that Pylican was trespassing or may have been engaged in theft or
burglary.

II.
Deputy Geisel Did Not Unreasonably Expand The Scope Of The Stop By Having Pylican
Exit The Car
The district court erroneously concluded that Deputy Geisel’s order that Pylican
exit the car during the traffic stop was unconstitutional. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-11.) It is
a “general rule that as a matter of course in a valid traffic stop, a police officer may order
the occupants of a vehicle to exit or to remain inside.” State v. Irwin, 143 Idaho 102, 105,
137 P.3d 1024, 1027 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added). See
also ----------State v. Ferreira, 133
- --Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999) (“once a motor vehicle has been
lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officer may order the driver to get out
4

of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures”). That the officer may order the driver from the car during a traffic
stop is a “per se rule.” Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412 (1997). Drivers and
passengers “‘have no Fourth Amendment right not to be ordered from their vehicle, once
a proper stop is made.’” Id. (citing concurring opinion). This is a “bright line” rule. Id. at
413, n.1. The Supreme Court of the United States has “held that officers may, consistent
with the Fourth Amendment, exercise their discretion to require a driver who commits a
traffic violation to exit the vehicle even though they lack any particularized reason for
believing the driver possesses a weapon.” New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 115 (1986)
(emphasis added). Because the Fourth Amendment was not implicated by the order to exit
the car during the course of an otherwise valid traffic stop, the district court erroneously
concluded that ordering Pylican from the car was a violation of her Fourth Amendment
rights. 1
Pylican argues that the district court correctly concluded that ordering a driver and
passenger from a car during a traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment if that order
facilitates a drug-dog sniff. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 12-14.) The law does not support this
argument.
Pylican relies on the district court’s analysis of Rodriguez v. United States, ___
U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). That case, however, does not stand for the proposition
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The district court concluded that ordering Pylican from the car both exceeded the scope
and lengthened the duration of the stop. (3/22/18 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 4-23.) As shown above
and in the state’s initial brief, there is no legal basis for holding that the order to exit
exceeded the scope of the traffic stop. Pylican does not attempt to defend this part of the
court’s analysis. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 12-14.) The state will thus reply only to the
argument that the order to exit the car unreasonably extended the length of the stop.
5

that ordering a motorist from a car during a traffic stop, a practice that has been
constitutional for more than four decades, is now unlawful.
In Rodriguez the officer finished the traffic stop, but detained Rodriguez for an
additional seven or eight minutes to conduct a drug-dog sniff. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at
1613. The question addressed by the Court was “whether police routinely may extend an
otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog
sniff.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. Holding that it may not, the Court reasoned that “a
dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission” because it lacks
“the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries.” Id. at ___, 135
S. Ct. at 1615.
In dissent Justice Alito called the majority holding “arbitrary” and “perverse”
because the Fourth Amendment violation resulted from “the sequence in which [the
officer] chose to perform his tasks.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1624. Justice Alito noted the
officer “could have conducted the dog sniff while one of the tasks that the Court regards as
properly part of the traffic stop was still in progress, but that sequence would have entailed
unnecessary risk.” Id. Delaying the dog sniff until backup arrived (and therefore after the
traffic warning was delivered) was reasonable for officer safety.

Id.

Justice Alito

concluded that “an action that would have been lawful had the officer made the
unreasonable decision to risk his life became unlawful when the officer made the
reasonable decision to wait a few minutes for backup.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1624-25
(emphasis original).
The district court, and Pylican, rely on the portion of the majority opinion
responding to Justice Alito’s dissent. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 13-14.) Namely, the
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statement that “safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours” from the
purpose of the traffic stop are also detours from the traffic mission. Rodriguez, ___ U.S.
at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616.
This context shows that the safety precaution at issue in Rodriguez was the decision
to delay the dog sniff until several minutes after the traffic stop was concluded in order to
secure a backup officer. Such a safety precaution lacks “the same close connection to
roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries.” Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. In contrast, an
order to exit a lawfully stopped car carries such a close connection to roadway safety that
it may be issued “as a matter of course.” Wilson, 519 U.S. at 410. Rodriguez simply does
not stand for the proposition that ordering a driver from the car is not part of the officer’s
traffic mission.
The order to exit was as much a part of the traffic stop as the records check. 2 If the
records check, for example, led to the decision to conduct a dog sniff, that would not render
the records check a part of the dog sniff and outside of the traffic stop mission. An order
to exit, part of the course of the traffic stop, did not cease being part of the traffic stop
because a dog sniff was also conducted. The district court erred when it concluded an order
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Deputy Geisel testified that he ordered Pylican and her passenger from the car “mainly”
because of his suspicion regarding criminal activity at the storage facility, but also to
facilitate the dog sniff. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 46, L. 21 – p. 47, L. 13 (capitalization altered); see
also Preliminary Tr., p. 20, L. 17 – p. 21, L. 4.) The decision to order a driver to exit during
the course of a traffic stop is within the discretion of the officer, Class, 475 U.S. at 115;
need not be justified by suspicion of a safety risk, Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249,
258 (2007); and may be done as a matter of course, Irwin, 143 Idaho at 105, 137 P.3d at
1027. To the extent the district court applied a standard of parsing whether the order to
exit the car facilitated the legal traffic stop or the legal (but unsupported by reasonable
suspicion) dog sniff, such would create an unworkable standard requiring the state to prove
the officer’s subjective intent and provide a justification for the order that the constitution
does not require.
7

to exit in the course of the traffic stop was an unlawful extension of the traffic stop. To the
contrary, the order to exit was an allowable component of the traffic stop and did not
implicate Pylican’s Fourth Amendment rights.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order
granting suppression.
DATED this 4th day of February, 2019.
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